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THE RIGHTS OF A PLEDGOR ON TRANSFERS OF A
PLEDGE
By JAMES LE:wIS PARKS*
N certain communities, personal property of one kind or another
is frequently deposited by way of pledge or pawn to secure
the performance of an obligation. The question as to the rights
of the pledgor and pledgee in the property, both before and
after the maturity' of the debt is of importance, and the results
flowing from an improper and illegal transfer of the pledge by
the pledgee are often complicated. It is, accordingly, proposed in
the following pages to consider transactions involving transfers
of the property by the pledgee, and to endeavor to formulate the
rules which regulate the rights and obligations of the parties in
this respect.
According to Story's definition, which has been universally
accepted, a pledge or pawn is a "bailment of personal property
as security for some debt, or engagement."' The pledgee therefore has no title to the property deposited, but merely possession
thereof, the general property remaining in the pledgor, but the
pledgee has a possessory right in the chattel to the extent of his
debt, which amounts to a lien.' In the case of the ordinary bailment, the bailee's lien, according to the old common law, was only
a personal right, and if he parted with possession of the chattel,
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri.
'Story, Bailments, 5th Ed., sec. 286.
'Donald v. Suckling, (I866) L. R. i Q. B. 585; Halliday v. Holgate,
(1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 299; White v. Phelps, (1869) 14 Minn. 27; Norton v.
Baxter, (1889) 41 Minn. 146, 42 N. W. 865.
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except to a third party to be held in turn of him in bail, he lost
his lien. This was the case even though the transfer did not involve any element of conversion, but was intended to operate
merely as an assignment of the debt and lien.' The surrender of
possession of the chattel destroyed the lien. This, however, is
not always the case with the pledgee for he is permitted to assign
his debt and the security.' So too the pledgee can repledge the
chattel, but for no longer time or greater amount than it was
pledged to him for.' Apparently then in the matter of disposing
of his interest to a third party, the pledgee can freely do so, so
long as his act of transfer does not involve on his part an assertion of a right in the chattel greater than he was given by the contract of pledge. To this extent at least, the right of the pledgee
is not only a personal right, but is in result assimilated to a property interest in the goods. This should be the case, for if the
debt is assignable, then too the security, which is incidental to the
debt, ought also to be, and if the pledgee has a possessory right, he
ought to be able to transfer the same to any one that he may please,
if only the disposition does not amount to a denial of the pledgor's
general property right, and does not interfere with the latter's
right of redemption.!
'Ruggles v. Walker, (1861)
(1915)

34 Vt. 488; contra, Goyena v. Berdoulay,

154 N. Y. S. lO3. It is believed that the orthodox rule is unduly

stringent and serves no useful purpose. As the debt is today freely assignable everywhere, the security incidental to the debt and a part thereof
might well also be held to pass with the debt, where an intention to
pass it on is found.
'Belden v.Perkins, (1875) 78 Ill. 449; Drake v. Cloonan, (1894) 99
Mich. 121, 57 N. W. io98; Waddle v. Owen, (1895) 43 Neb. 489, 61 N. W.
731; Chapman v. Books, (1865) 31 N. Y. 75. See also, Van Eman v.
Stinchfield, (1868) 13 Minn. 75.
'Donald v. Suckling, (1866) L. R. i Q. B. 585 (dictum); -Meyer v.
Moss, (19o2) IiO La. 132, 34 So. 332, Coleman v. Anderson, (Tex. 1904)
82 S. W. 1057 (dictum) ; Drake v. Cloonan, (1894) 99 Mich. 121, 57 N. VW.
lo98. Of course the pledgee of the pledgee would acquire as security only
the rights in the property that the original pledgee had.
"It appears that the pawnee may deliver the goods to a stranger without consideration, or may sell and assign conditionally by way of pawn
without in either case destroying the original lien, or giving the owner a

right to reclaim them on any other or better terms than he could have

done before such delivery or assignment." Jarvis v. Rogers, (1819) 15
Mass. 389, 4o8. If the right were merely personal, none of the above
mentioned things could have been done. If, however, the decisions had
held the other way, they would not have been beyond reason. In Donald
v. Suckling, (1866) L. R. i Q. B. 585, 618, Cockburn, C. J. said:
"I think it unnecessary to -the decision in the present case to determine
whether a party with whom an article has been pledged . . . has a
right to transfer his interest. . . . I should certainly hesitate to lay
down the affirmative of that proposition. Such a right in the pawnee
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It has been held that a pledgee may also deliver the possession of the pledge to the pledgor without losing his lien, if it is delivered in bailment for a special purpose. This has been done and
the lien sustained.! Under these conditions, it is said that "the
possession of the pledgor is perfectly consistent with the original
right of the pledgee."' The pledgor is here holding the goods, not
in his own right, but in subservience to the pledgee's special possessory interest. On the other hand, if the chattels are given in bailment to the pledgor for general use, the courts will not sustain the
pledgee's lien as against innocent purchasers from, and creditors
of the pledgor, even though there has been a special contract between the parties for the preservation of the lien.'
Probably too
seems inconsistent with the undoubted right of the pledgor to have the

thing pledged returned to him immediately on the tender of the amount for
which the pledge was given. In some instances it may well be inferred
from the nature of the thing pledged

.

.

. that the pawnor though

perfectly willing that the article should be intrusted to the custody of the
pawnee would not have parted with it on the terms it should be passed on
to others and committed to the custody of strangers." The notion of the
chief justice, however, has not prevailed. But the dictum raises two
important questions, to be dealt with infra, a transfer of the pledge being permissible, (i) to whom must the pledgor make tender at the maturity of the debt, and (2) if the pledged property is injured or converted
by the transferee against whom may the pledgor proceed?
"Cooley v. Transfer Co., (1893) 53 Minn. 327, 55 N. W. i41; Palmtag
v. Doutrick, (i88i) 59 Cal. 154, 43 Am. Rep. 245; Thayer v. Dwight,
(i87o) io4 Mass. 254; Wilkinson v. Misner, (1911) i58 Mo. App. 551, 138

S. W. 931; Macauley v. Macauley, (885) 35 Hun (N. Y.) 556. But see
contra, Bodenhammer v. Newsome, (1857) 5 Jones (N. C.) io7, 69 Am.
Dec. 775, holding that the lien would not be sustained as against an innocent purchaser dealing with the pledgor believing, because of the
pledgor's possession, that the latter was the owner of the property. The
court held the pledgee estopped to assert his lien. Obviously if the pledgee
delivers back possession of the pledge to the pledgor without any agreement with respect to the lien, it is gone. The pledgee's conduct under
such conditions is a waiver of the lien. Bank v. Bradshaw, (1912) 91
Neb. 210, 135 N. W. 83o.

In the case of the ordinary bailment, the rule at the common law was
if the bailee parted with possession of the property to the bailor the lien
was lost under all conditions. "The very definition of the word lien as
'the right to retain' indicates that it must cease when possession is relinquished." McFarland v. Wheeler, (1841) 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467, 473.
Occasionally the pledgee has given the custody of the property to the
pledgor. The property has not been bailed with the pledgor, but has been
loaned, or entrusted to the pledgor as the borrower or servant of the
pledgee. In such a case it is clear that the lien should not be lost and the
authority is accord. The possession of the borrower or servant is that of
the lender or master. Reeves v. Capper, (1838) 5 Bing. N. C. 136; Clare
v. Agerter, (1892) 47 Kan. 6o4, 28 Pac. 694. See generally as to the distinction between custody and possession, Pollock and Wright, Possession
in the Common Law 138 et seq.
'Palmtag v. Doutrick, (i88i) 59 Cal. 154, 159, 43 Am. Rep. 245.
"Walker v. Staples, (1862) 5 Allen (Mass.) 34; Gamson v. Pritchard,
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the lien would not be sustained as against the pledgor under these
conditions." It is usually said that the reason for holding the
lien to be invalid under these facts is because the essence of the
same is the retention of the property over which it exists. If
therefore, the property is not retained the lien must be gone." If
this is the real reason for the rule, it is difficult to understand
how the lien in cases of special, limited bailments with the pledgor can be sustained, because in that case the pledgee does not
keep possession of the chattels. But perhaps the cases of special
bailments may be considered as cases of custody and so reconciled
with, and distinguished from those now under consideration."
Unless, however, such a distinction can be made, it is not perceived how the cases can be reconciled. In fact, if the pledgee's
right is merely a right to retain, all cases where he parts with
the possession of the pledge, except for purposes of enforcing
his lien, ought to result in the loss of the lien, but, as has been
shown, this is not the result, and accordingly it cannot be said that
the lien is a right solely to retain dependent for its existence on
actual and continued possession of the goods. There are too
(1911) 210 Mass. 296, 96 N. E. 715; Colby v. Cressy, (i83o) 5 N. H. 237;
Jackson v. Kincaid, (1896) 4 Okla. 554, 46 Pac. 587 (statute); Fletcher
v. Howard, (1826) 2 Aikens (Vt.) I15, I6 Am. Dec. 686.. See also Combs

v. Tuchelt, (1878) 24 Minn. 432.
"The cases often suggest that the lien would not be good, under these
conditions, probably because of the notion which the courts have and
repeatedly state, although usually obiter, that a pledgee has only a personal right to retain possession. This was the conception, which the
courts had as to the lien of the ordinary bailee (see supra, note 8) and it
was natural and easy to carry over the same ideas when it came to dealing
with the lien of a pledgee. It is believed that this conception is unfortunate and that the actual decisions do not of necessity support the proposition. See infra note 12 and text in connection therewith. But see
dictum, McFarland v. Wheeler, (1841) 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467, 482: "Such'
* lien may be continued . . . so far as the parties are concerned
even after the actual possession has been parted with; but not to the prejudice of general creditors . . ." The dictum is the obiter opinion of
Chancellor Walworth. See also, Staples v. Simpson, (1894) 6o Mo. App.
73.
"McFarland v. Wheeler, (1841) 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467 (dictum).
"Continuance in possession is indispensable to the right of a lien; an abandonment of custody . . . frustrates any power to retain (i. e. the
chattels) and operates as an absolute waiver of the lien." Walker v.
Staples, (1862) 5 Allen 35. "Indeed possession may be considered as the
very essence of a pledge . . . and if possession be once given up, the
pledge is as such extinguished." Casey v. Cavaroc, (0877) 96 U. S. 467,
477, 24 L. Ed. 779. In the two cases, cited last, the question as to the
validity of the lien was between the pledgee and an innocent person claiming under the pledgor, and the pledgor had been placed in possession of
the chattels for general purposes.
"See supra note 8.
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many cases holding the lien valid where there is no possession in
the pledgee.
The proper basis for the decisions to the effect that the lien
is gone, if the property is returned to the possession of the
pledgor for general use, is that the pledgor's possession clothes
him with apparent ownership of the pledge, and, because of this
fact, makes fraud on creditors of and innocent purchasers from
the pledgor too easy. The law has never favored secret liens." If
the lien is declared invalid on this ground, all of the cases are
easily reconciled, and we are not forced to say what is not so,
namely that the pledgee's right is merely one to retain possession
of the pledged property. Furthermore, if this is the reason for
refusing to sanction the lien, it could be said, with perfect propriety and consistency, that the lien would be good in favor of
the pledgee as against the pledgor, and until the rights of a bona
fide purchaser or creditor have intervened. In other words, if
the pledgee is not estopped to assert the lien, he can do so, and he
will not be estopped until some one has taken the goods from the
pledgor, reasonably assuming that the latter's possession signified
ownership. The basis for such a decision would not be that the
pledgee has only a personal right, but that it would not be just to
permit the assertion of his right to security against an innocent
buyer from the pledgor, or the latter's creditor. But even though
the law might not be willing to give the pl~dgee a right against
the pledgor, when possession of the goods has been given to the
latter, it could still so refuse to do without holding that the
pledgee's right is gone because the right depended on continued
possession. It could be held that, as a matter of policy, no right
ought to remain in the pledgee under these conditions because of
the ever present danger of fraud to third parties. Such a holding would reach the result desired, and at the same time would
obviate the confusion that is bound to arise in other cases, if it is
stated that the pledgee's interest is a purely personal one.
Wherever the transfer of the pledge by the pledgee to a third
party is actually and expressly made, and is legal, there is no
difficulty in determining the rights- resulting, but occasionally the
""The requirement of possession is an inexorable rule of law, adopted

to prevent fraud and deception, for if the debtor remains in possession
the law presumes that those who deal with him do so on the faith of his
being the unqualified owner of the goods." Casey v. Cavaroc, (1877) 96
U. S. 467, 490, 24 L. Ed. 779. See also Moors v. Reading, (1897) 167
Mass. 322, 45 N. E. 760, and Glenn, Creditors' Rights chap. XI.
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pledgee does not transfer the property, but merely the debt, and
the question then is, does the assignment of the debt operate to
carry with it to the assignee the security as well? It is not possible to say that the assignment gives a legal title to the pledge to
the assignee, for there has been no delivery of the chattel, actual
or symbolical, and that is always essential if a possessory interest
is being transferred. But even so, it might be held that the assignee in equity ought to have a right to use the chattel, if he desires to avail himself of the security. The assignor could be said
to be the trustee with respect to the security for the assignee, and
there is authority for such a rule.' It has, however, been held
contra to this, it being said that in the absence of an express agreement giving the assignee the benefit of the pledge, these equitable
rights ought not to pass." It is a question of whether or not a
court is inclined to the belief that the assignor intended to give
the assignee, as a result of the transfer of the debt, all rights with
respect to its collection that he had. An affirmative answer to
this question would not seem to be stretching one's imagination,
and accordingly it is urged that a decision, which gives the assignee of the debt, by implication, the right to the security as
well, is sound and just.
Whenever the pledgee transfers his rights in the debt and
security to a third party, it becomes necessary to determine the
rights and obligation of the pledgor on the maturity of the debt,
afid how he will entitle himself to regain possession of the pledged
chattel. At an early date it was suggested that the pledgor could
not be required to pay the debt to a person other than the original
pledgee, because he had never agreed to do so, ' but this dictum
has not been followed and the cases hold that in the event of the
transfer of the debt and the security, and notice being given to
the pledgor of this fact, he must pay the assignee, and cannot
claim the property free from the lien unless he makes due tender
to the latter.' Such a rule only carries out the ordinary rule in
"Ramboz v. Stansbury, (igio) 13 Cal. App. 649, io Pac. 472; Perry
v. Parrett, (igoi) 135 Cal. 238, 67 Pac. 144; Hawkins v. Bank, (897)
150 Ind. 117, 49 N. E. 957; Holland, etc., Co. v. See, (igio) 146 Mo. App.
269, 130 S. WK.354. See also Ware Murphy Co. v. Russell, (1876) 57
Ala. 144, 29 Am. Rep. 710; in the last cited case the court held that the
security would follow the debt, but did not go into the question whether
the assignment would be an equitable one, or would amount to a legal
assignment of title.
"Johnson v. Smith, (i85o) ii Humph. (Tenn.) 396.
"Donald v. Suckling, (1866) L. R. i Q. B. 585.
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the matter of assignments. The debtor must always, on notice
being given to him of the assignment, respect the rights of the assignee. Of course, if the debtor should happen to pay the debt in
good faith to the pledgee, not knowing of the assignment, then he
ought to be able to claim and regain the pledge from the assignee
without offering to pay the debt, for the burden is on the assignee
to bring home notice to the pledgor of the assignment! It is difficult, however, to conceive of the last suggested case ever actually
arising because, as a rule, the pledgor when he makes a tender
will demand a return of the pledge, and if it is not returned to
him, he will usually receive sufficient information to put him on
inquiry as to whether or not there has not been an assignment of
the debt. If the pledgor were thus put on inquiry, he ought to be
held to pay the pledgee at his peril.*°
It will sometimes happen that the pledgee will transfer his
interest in the pledge and debt to a third party legally, and an injury to or conversion of the property will occur after the transfer. There is no question but what the pledgor could, if he so
desired, sue the assignee and recover.' The assignee should take
the property subject to the burdens and the pledgor's general property right therein. The assignee would be equally obligated with
respect to the safekeeping and the return of the pledge. But perhaps the pledgor would rather sue the pledgee; perhaps an action
against the latter would be more profitable' and worth while. What
little authority there is dealing with this problem holds that the
pledgor, after the pledgee has legally passed the pledge on to another, cannot hold the pledgee to any of his original obligations
as to the property. It is said that the pledgee may legally part with
the debt and with his possession of the property and interest
therein and, when he does, his transferee is substituted in his
place. A pledgee "cannot be charged with the wrongful act of
"Talty v. Freedman's, etc., Co., (1876) 93 U.S. 321, 23 L. Ed. 886;
Bradley v. Parks, (1876) 83 Ill. i69; Goss v. Emerson, (I85I) 23 N. H.
38, holding that the pledgee's interest is assignable, but not dealing with
the matter of tender. Blundell-Leigh v. Attenborough, EI92I] 3 K. B. 235.
"Williston, Contracts, secs. 413 and 433.
'It might well be said that the debtor would be on inquiry and thus
have notice from the very fact that the pledgee did not offer to return the
pledge on the tender of the debt. This fact should indicate to the pledgor
that the property might be in the hands of some other person than the
pledgee, claiming a right under the latter.
"The cases rather assume this proposition than decide it, but see Bank
of Forsyth v. Davis, (igoi) 113 Ga. 341, 38 S. E. 836; Taggart v. Packard,
(1867) 39 Vt. 628; Dibert v. D'Arcy, (1912) 248 Mo. 617, 651, 154 S. XV.
1116.
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another over which he has no control. A mortgagee might as well
be held liable for the destruction of the mortgaged property after
It
he has parted with all his interest by a valid assignment."'
in
this
is
reached
result
would seem that the logical and proper
case. After all the pledgor must be taken as knowing that the
debt is assignable; that with it may go the pledged property and
that as a result of the assignment the pledgee has stepped out of
the transaction altogether.
A pledgee has occasionally attempted to pass the pledged property without the debt, retaining the right to collect the latter himself. It has been held, under these conditions, that the transferee
of the property gets nothing, and that the lien cannot in this way
be severed from the debt. The only justification for the existence
of the lien is the fact that it is security for the debt, which is the
principal thing. Accordingly it is right to hold that an attempted
assignment of the lien without the debt is a nullity, serving to vest
no rights in the transferee whatsoever.-2 It would seem to follow
too that even though a pledgee has not passed the lien to his transferee that the result of his attempted transfer ought to destroy
his own right to the security. While it is true that the attempted
assignment or grant was not effective in the way desired, still at
least it did show that the lien was not desired by the pledgee any
longer as security, and this fact, coupled with the actual giving tip
of the possession of the property, ought to end the lien altogether.
After the pledgee has abandoned his right, he ought not to be
heard to say that his right is revived just because he was unable
to carry out his original intent with respect to the transfer.
If the pledgee passes the property to another, and the transaction involves the assertion of a greater right in the property on
"Goss v. Emerson, (1851) 23 N. H. 43. In this case the debt secured
was negotiable. In Bank of Forsyth v. Davis, (IgoI) 113 Ga. 341, 38 S.
E. 836, it was held accord, but the court suggested, ii3 Ga. 342, that if the
debt was not negotiable and the pledgee's successor had converted the
property that the pledgee would also be liable for this act. The court
seemed inclined to the opinion that the pledgee whose debt is negotiable
is licensed to freely pass the pledge to another and escape his liabilities,
whereas the pledgee whose debt is non-negotiable would not be free to do
so. It is to be noted, however, that this is not the underlying theory of
Goss v. Emerson, (185i) 23 N. H. 43. The distinction would not seem
to be well taken, for non-negotiable choses must be regarded today as being freely assignable, if not freely "alienable." But see Cockburn, C. J.
in Donald v. Suckling, (I866) L. R. i Q. B. 585.
'Easton v. Hodges, (1883) i8 Fed. 677 (dictum); Van Eman v.
Stinchfield, (1867) 13 Minn. 75. See also Dexter v. McClellan, (i897)
1i6 Ala. 184, 22 So. 461.
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his part than he legally has, the transfer and disposition is illegal.
This is the result if the pledgee disposes of the property as his
own;" or if he pledges the property to secure a debt greater in
amount than that secured to him; or, it would seem, if he pledges
the property for no greater amount, but for a longer period of time
than it was pledged to him for; or if he improperly exercises his
power of sale to satisfy the debt.'" In all of these cases the question arises as to the rights of the pledgor both as against the
pledgee, and the latter's transferee.
If at the time of the transfer, the debt has been paid, the
,pledgor could recover of the pledgee the full value of the propand this should be recoverable in an action sounding in
ert'
conversion7 or the pledgor should be permitted to waive the tort
and sue in assumpsit for goods sold and delivered." A pledgor
ought also to be able to sue in either one of these forms of action,
if, at the time of the transfer, the debt had matured, and he had
duly tendered the amount thereof to the pledgee, but in this case
the amount of his recovery should be reduced by the amount of
the debt with the interest thereon. The debt is proper matter for
recoupment.2
'Gay v. Moss, (1867) 34 Cal. 125; Upham v. Barbour, (1896) 65
Minn. 364, 68 N. W. 42; Wood v. Matthews, (i88I) 73 Mo. 477; Wilson
v. Little, (1849) 2 N. Y. 443, 51 Am. Dec. 307. See also Scott v. Reed,
(igoi) 83 Minn. 2o3, 85 N. W. 1OI2. In a case where the pledge is of
shares of stock, it has been held that the pledgee is not bound to keep the
specific shares on hand, and there is no conversion if at all times he keep
in hand the same number of the same kind of shares as were pledged.
Berlin v. Eddy, (z863) 33 Mo. 426. But see contra holding that the
identical shares must be returned, Allen v. Dubois, (1898) 117 Mich. 115,

75 N. W. 443.
'Richardson v. Ashby, (i895) 132 Mo. 238, 33 S.W. 8o6; -Smith v.
Savin, (894) 14I N. Y. 315, 36 N. E. 338; Work v. Bennett, (1872) 7o
Pa. St. 484.
'Greer v. Bank, (1895) 128 Mo. 559, 30 S. W. 319; Feige v. Burt,
(1898) I8 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928, 74 A. S. R. 390; Ainsworth v. Bowen,
(1859)
26

9 Wis. 348.

aHilgert v. Levin, (1897)

v. O'Brien, (90oo)

72

Mo. 48 (illegal debt secured); August

50 App. Div. 626, 63 N. Y. S. 989.

"Jackson v. Shawl, (1865) 29 Cal. 267; Hazard v. Loring, (1852) 1o
Cush. (Mass.) 267; Cass v. Higenbotam, (1885) ioo N. Y. 248, 3 N. E.
i89; Southworth Co. v. Lamb, (1884) 82 Mo. 242.
'Whiting v. McDonald, (1790) I Root (Conn.) 444; Bryson v. Raynor, (1866) 25 Md. 424, 90 Am. Dec. 69 (dictum).

See also Woodward,

Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 277.
449; Baltimore Marine Ins. Co. v.
2'Belden v. Perkins, (1875) 78 Ill.
Dalrymple, (i866) 25 Md. 269; Farrar v. Paine, (1889) 173 Mass. 58, 53
N. E. 146; Feige v. Burt, (1898) 118 Mich. 243, 77 N. W. 928; Cropsey v.
Averill, (1879) 8 Neb. 151. But see contra Ball v. Stanley,
(1833) 5 Yerger (Tenn.) 199, 26 Am. Dec. 263, holding that
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A pledgee may illegally transfer the pledge before the maturity of the debt, or, if it has matured, before a tender has been
made or the debt paid. Under these states of facts the pledgor
ought to be able to sue in case for the destruction of his general
property right, and should recover the difference between the
value of the property at the time of its appropriation and the
amount of the debt, plus the interest allowable on the same. Such
an amount would represent the value of his interest.'
There
would also appear to be no objection under the assumed facts if
the pledgee's act of transfer was a sale, to permit the pledgor to
sue in assumpsit for money had and received, and to recover in
such an action the difference between the amount that the pledgee
had received on the sale of the pledge, and the amount of the debt
with interest to the date of the sale. Everything in the way of
value in the property in excess of the amount of the debt belongs
to the pledgor. The law has been jealous of the pledgor's "equity"
and zealous to safeguard and preserve it for him whenever possible. While the pledgee is permitted, as a rule, to hold thepledge
so long as the debt is unpaid, and the pledgor cannot compel the
former to sell the pledge and by so doing to realize for him the
excess value of the property over and above the amount of the
debt, still if the pledgee does sell, it ought to be for the pledgor's
account, and anything in excess of the debt derived from the sale
ought to be given to the pledgor. This being the duty of the
pledgee, it might very well be said that the pledgor should be in a
position, if the pledgee has tortiously sold the goods, to say that
the money realized from the sale in excess of the debt was his and
was received to his use. The only obstacle to such a contention by
the pledgor would be the fact that the pledgee, when he sold the
goods, did not intend to satisfy the debt, but the latter ought not
to be allowed to make such a contention, because, in order to do so,
he will have to explain that his sale was illegal and tortious. Of
the pledgee may not recoup the amount of his debt, but will have to bring
another action to recover the same.
'Nabring v. Bank, (1877) 58 Ala. 204. In this case the plaintiff had
pledged shares in a corporation to the defendant, who had appropriated
the same and sold them. It was held that if the defendant had transferred
the shares to his own name that perhaps trover would not lie, but that case
would for the destruction of the plaintiff's general property interest.

'"Lake v. Little Rock Trust Co., (19o5) 77 Ark. 53, 9o S. W. 847; Min-

neapolis & N. Elevator Co. v. Betcher, (i8go) 42 Minn. 2IO, 44 N. W. 5;
Cooper v. Simpson, (i8go) 41 Minn. 46, 42 N. W. 6oi. But see National
Exchange Bank v. Kilpatric, (1907) 204 Mo. 119, 102 S W. 499.
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course, it might also be said, in a case where the sale happened before the maturity of the debt, that from the very nature of things
it would be impossible to satisfy a debt not as yet due, but the
only objection to accelerating the maturity of any obligation is
that so doing may injure one of the parties by varying the terms
of the bargain. The pledgee, however, here is in no position to
make an objection of this kind, as he has already appropriated
the debtor's money. He should not be heard to say that he did
this for any purpose other than the satisfaction of the debt. So
far as the pledgor is concerned, he ought to have a choice, either
to say that there has or has not been a satisfaction of the debt.
No authority which permits the pledgor to sue, under the assumed
facts, in assumpsit for money had and received has been found,
but upon general principles, because of the fact that the pledgee
has been unjustly enriched to this extent, the action should lie."
It seems needless, however, to say that if the pledgee's act of
transfer was not a sale the action for money had and received
would not lie, for, without a sale, there has been no receipt of
money by the pledgee at all' If there was no sale, the pledgor's
remedy would be in case, as above stated.
'the question remains whether the pledgor may sue the pledgee
in conversion if the pledgee has illegally transferred the property,
and the pledgor has neither paid nor tendered the amount of the
debt? This question might be presented in a case where the
pledgee made the transfer before the maturity of the debt secured
and the pledgor attempted to sue before that time, or in a case
where the pledgee transferred the property either before or after
the maturity of the debt, but the pledgor was suing after such time.
An easy way of disposing of the whole question, and a way
adopted by many cases is to say that when the pledgee wrongfully
disposes of the property, this act ends the bailment, destroys the
lien, and entitles the pledgor to the immediate possession of the
goods." Under such a line of decisions, all that a pledgor need
show is the pledgee's act of transfer, and the court will entertain
'See Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 273. It has also been

held that a pledgor may sue the pledgee for breach of the contract to
safely keep and restore the pledge. Brown v. First National Bank, (1904)
66 C. C. A. 293, 132 Fed. 45o. The measure of damages in such an action
would be the same as in case, or in assumpsit for money had and received.
'Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, sec. 273.
"Depuy v. Clark, (1859) 12 Ind. 427; Baltimore Marine Ins. Co. v.
Dalrymple, (1866) 25 Md. 269; Cortelyou v. Lansing, (18o5) 2 Caines Cas.
(N. Y.) 2oo; Glidden v. Mechanics National Bank, (895) 53 Ohio St.
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the action, usually assessing the damages at the value of the goods
at the time of the pledgee's wrongful act' less the amount of the
debt with interest thereon to the date of the judgment. Of course
the reasoning adopted in these cases dispenses with the necessity
of a tender, and because the bailment is at an end would permit
the pledgor to sue for the conversion of the goods even before the
maturity of the debt." It is to be noted that the measure of
damages recoverable in such an action is substantially the same
as in an action on the case, or in the case of a sale
by the pledgee in an action of assumpsit for money had and received, and accordingly it can be said that the result of such a
holding is in the usual case, not improper. It is believed, however, that there is no proper theoretical basis for holding that
the pledgor's right to sue in conversion' is as of the date of the
pledgee's illegal transfer of the pledge, regardless of the question
whether or not the debt has matured at that time, and .the pledgor
tendered the same to the pledgee. It is urged that unless the
pledgor can rescind the agreement, without the maturity of the
debt and a tender of the same the pledgor has no right to sue in
conversion, but that his remedy should be as above explained,
namely case, or possibly assumpsit for money had and received if
the act of transfer by the pledgee was a sale of the pledge. It is
also submitted that if a pledgor may rescind the contract, he cannot claim possession of the goods without first making tender of
the debt.
An action for conversion is predicated on the fact that a plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of the chattel and has
been deprived thereof. If the theory of the action is trover, the
plaintiff recovers money, but the money is allowed in lieu of the
chattel, and the plaintiff has a right to the money only because he
has a still more fundamental right to the chattel. In other words,
money is substituted for the specific chattel, and its recovery is
588, 42 N. E. 995; Austin v. Vanderbilt, (19o6) 48 Ore. 2o6, 85 Pac. 519,
6 L. R. A. (N.S.) 298, 12o A. S. R. 8oo; Work v. Bennett, (1872) 7o Pa.
484.
"Occasionally the courts have adopted as the
measure of damages the
highest intermediate value of the converted property between the time of
its conversion and the date of the trial of the action. This rule f6r assessing damages, however, has usually been confined to cases where the
property converted consisted of stocks or bonds or some article fluctuating
value. See infra note 42 and text in connection therewith.
"No case has been found where the action has been entertained before
the maturity of the debt, although as indicated such an action, under the
theory adopted, would be properly brought.
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not allowed unless the plaintiff has a right to the possession of
the chattel at the time that he brings his action." In every pledge
transaction the agreement between the parties is that the property
is not to be returned to the pledgor until the'debt has been paid,
and so by the very terms of the contract the pledgor is precluded
from asserting a right to a return of the pledged property until
the debt has been satisfied, or at least until he has offered to pay
the same and his tender has been rejected.' It is because of this
contractual obligation resting on the pledgor that it is urged that
theoretically the action of conversion ought not to lie if only the
pledgee has misappropriated the goods. To make the pledgee's
conduct objectionable in this form of action, in the absence of a
rescission of the contract by the pledgor, in addition to the illegal
disposition of the goods by the pledgee the debt should have
matured and the amount thereof either been paid, or tendered.
The pledgee's wrong ought not to make the pledgor's rights
greater, nor put him in a better or different position with respect
to the possession of the pledge than he would have been in had
there been no misappropriation by the pledgee. Accordingly the
sounder cases are to the effect that the pledgor, if he is affirming
his rights as a pledgor, in spite of the illegal transfer by the
pledgee, cannot sue in conversion until he has tendered the amount
of the debt, which could not occur until after the maturity of
the same.3'
It will be argued against this last suggestion of the writer
T
Gordon v. Harper, (1796) 7 Durn. & East 9; Union Stock Yards &
Transit Co. v.Mallory, (1895) 157 I1. 554, 41 N. E. 888; Stearns v. Vincent, (1883) 5o Mich. 209, 15 N. V. 86, 45 A. S. R. 37; Brown v. Pratt,
(1855) 4 Wis. 513, 65 Am. Dec. 330. See also Sunderland, Damages, 4th

ed. sec. iio8.

"

.

.

.

to entitle the plaintiff to recover two things are

necessary: first property in the plaintiff; and secondly a wrongful conversion by the defendant."
'A tender of the debt when due ought to be the equivalent of performance so far as the bringing of the action of trover is concerned. Upon
tender the pledgor has put the pledgee in default; see, 1%McCalla v. Clark,
(1875) 55 Ga. 53; Norton v. Baxter, (1889) 41 Minn. 146, 42 N. W. 865;
Lawrence v. Maxwell, (1873) 53 N. Y. ig.
""But it is a contradiction in fact, and would be to call a thing that
which it is not to say that a pledgee consents by his act to revest in the
pledgor the.immediate interest or right in the pledge, which by the bargain
is out of the pledgor and in the pledgee. Therefore for any such wrong
an action of trover or detinue, each of which assumes an immediate right
of possession in the plaintiff, is not maintainable, for that right is clearly
not in the plaintiff." Halliday v. Holgate, (1868) L. R. 3 Ex. 299, 392.
See also accord Donald v. Suckling, (1866) L. R. I Q. B. 585, which was
followed in the Halliday case. See also accord McClintock v. Central
Bank of Kansas City. (1893) 120 Mo. 127, 24 S. W. 1052; Scaaf v. Fries,
(i9o0) go Mo. App. iii; Hopper v. Sage, (1882) 63 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 34.
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that the bailment is ended as soon as the pledgee converts the
pledge and that therefore an immediate right to possession of the
same accrues in favor of the pledgor" It is not believed, however, that such an argument can lead to such a result. There is
more than a bailment involved in the transaction. The pledgor
has agreed that the possession of the property shall be out of him
until the debt is paid, and this agreement, even though the pledgee
has breached his contract is binding on the former. Perhaps the
pledgee's breach might warrant the pledgor's seeking to rescind
the contract"1 and claiming as a result of the rescission that he
is entitled to a return of the pledge. But in every case of rescission there must be restitution, which would entail the pledgor's
returning the money loaned. It seems certain that the pledgor
can only claim a right to the possession of the pledged property
if he is either affirming the contract, or rescinding it, and in each
case his right to the same can only be based on the fact that he has
offered the money to the pledgee.
It might be said that requiring a tender by the pledgor is futile; why compel a man to make a tender and demand a return
of the goods when his demand will only be refused, which will of
necessity be the case here? -It would seem that a sufficient answer to such a question would be that without the tender no right
exists. But, in addition to this reason, it is believed That fixing
the date of tender a§ the time when the pledgor will have a right
to the possession of the property will in some cases make the
matter of assessing damages easier and more accurate. Suppose
that the appropriation of the property occurs before the maturity
of the debt, and at that time the same is worth $60, but at the
time of the maturity of the debt it is worth $100; if justice is to be
done to the pledgor he ought to be able to compel the pledgee to
account for the greater sum, and this will be easy if it is said that
the right of the pledgor arises at the time when he makes a tender
and not before. Or again, suppose that the goods at the time of
their appropriation were worth $100, but at the time of the
maturity of the debt were worth merely $60; in trover it would
be proper to allow to the pledgor the value of the property at the
time that he, by his agreement, would have been entitled to them
and no more, yet if it is held that the pledgor's right is as of the
"°See supra note 34, and text in connection therewith.
"As to this suggestion see infra note 43 and text in connection therewith.
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date that the pledgee appropriated the property, the pledgor will
receive $40 more than he would have gotten had there been no
breach of the contract at all. The fact is that if we hold that the
pledgor's right to the possession of the goods, and hence to sue
in conversion, arises at the very moment of the pledgee's transfer
of the pledge, we are not dealing with the situation as it is. We
are not treating the matter accurately and with precision, and in
the matter of measuring damages the rule will not at all times
afford a proper amount of compensation. Sometimes the pledgor
will not receive enough and sometimes too much. On the other
hand, if we treat the rights of the parties as they actually are
under the contract and hold that the pledgor's right to possession
(and hence his right to sue in conversion) does not arise until he
has made a tender, we shall be able to give him in the way of
damages exactly the sum of money that he expected to get out of
the contract, and which it was agreed that he should get.
The amount of money which a pledgor will recover, if he
sues in case, and that which he will recover if he sues in conversion upon the theory that his right is as of the date of the
pledgee's transfer of the property will be the same. In a loose
sense therefore, it cannot be said that the latter group of decisions
goes very far wrong, but the fact is that a pledgor ought to have
an election between case on the one hand and trover or conversion
on the other. The pledgor ought to be able to claim the value of
his general property interest either at the time of the illegal disposition of the property by the pledgee, or at the time of the
maturity of the debt and tender. It is the function of case to
enable the pledgor to recover the first mentioned sum, and should
be the function of trover to enable him to recover the last mentioned. But trover can only do this if it is held that the right to
the possession of the pledge is as of the date of tender. If it is
held that the right to possession is as of the date of the transfer
of the pledge the result of the action is to allow the pledgor as
damages only the value of his property interest at the time of its
destruction. There can be no objection to this so long as the
value of the pledge does not change, but if the property rises in
value the pledgor will lose the amount of the increase, unless indeed some unusual measure of damages is adopted to offset the
error into which the decisions have fallen. This result in some
cases has been prevented by permitting the pledgor to recover in
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trover as the value of the property its highest value between the
time of its transfer by the pledgee and the trial of the action
This measure of damages has been especially adopted in cases
where the pledge has been one of stocks and bonds the value of
which fluctuates from day to day in the market. Obviously
where this is the rule no harm is done the pledgor, and he is not
legally deprived of his election, but the rule does not set the theory
of the cases aright, nor return trover to the performance of its
proper role in the law of conversion.
According to some decisions, if a party to a contract breaks
the same and his breach goes to the essence, his promisee in addition to being able to sue on the contract and recover damages,
may rescind and upon making restitution or offering to make it
may claim a right to the return of that which he has already given
to his defaulting promisor by way of performance of his side of
the agreement." Perhaps there is room for the application of
this doctrine to a case where a pledgee has illegally appropriated
or disposed of the pledge. There can be no question but what
such an act on the part of the pledgee is a breach of the contract
which goes to the essence of the agreement; why not then permit
the pledgor to return the amount of the debt with interest thereon,
and demand the return of the pledge, and, in case of the pledgee's
refusal, permit an action of trover to lie? If such an action were
allowed it would follow that the pledgor could sue at any time
after the transfer of the pledge by the pledgee upon making tender
of the debt with a proper amount of interest. The writer knows
of no case which has proceeded on the suggested theory, but such
procedure would seem to be unobjectionable."
2
Douglas v. Kraft, ;(1858) 9 Cal. 562; Markham v. Jaudon, (1869) 41
N. Y. 235. Other cases allow a plaintiff the highest intermediate value of
the converted property between the time of its conversion and a reasonable
time after notice of this act has been received by the plaintiff. Dimock
v. United States National Bank, (1893) 55 N. J. L. 296, 25 Atl. 926;
Galigher v. Jones, (1888) 129 U. S. 193, 32 L. Ed. 658, 9 S. C. R. 335. As
stated in the text the "highest intermediate value" rule for measuring
damages has been confined for the most part to .cases of conversion of
commercial securities. Same cases have refused to even apply the rule in
such situations. See, Jamison & Co.'s Estate, (1894) 163 Pa. 143, 29 Atl.
Ioo; Baltimore Marine Ins. Co. v. Dalrymple, (1866) 25 Md. 269.
"3 Williston, Contracts sec. 1455 et seq.
"The right to rescind is not universally acknowledged. Thus a seller
is held not to have the right to rescind his contract if the buyer fails to
perform, Williston, Sales sec. 511. There is, however, authority recognizing the right of rescission in the case of a contract for the conveyance of
land. In Ankenny v. Clark, (1892) 148 U. S. 345, 37 L. Ed. 475, 13 S. C. R.
617, plaintiff was allowed to recover the value of wheat given to the de-
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In all cases of conversion, by the better considered authorities,
a plaintiff may %vaivehis tort, as it is said, and sue in assumpsit
for unjust enrichment. The action will be for goods sold and
delivered, or if the conversion has been a sale, for money had and
received.'5 A pledgor, therefore, in the event of the- pledgee's
having illegally appropriated the property to his own use may sue
in assumpsit instead of in conversion. In a case of this kind there
are two remedies afforded for the same wrong, either of which
may be availed of, i. e. the pledgor has an election. The action
of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered is based on the conversion of the property and the same facts which must be shown bthe pledgor to entitle him to sue in conversion must also be shown
to entitle him to sue in assumpsit, and the measure of damages
will be the same in either action. If therefore, a pledgor sues for
goods sold and delivered, his right to do so ought to depend on the
theory prevailing in the particular jurisdiction as to when the
right to sue in conversion arises. If it is held that there is a right
to sue in conversion without tender, then there ought to be a right
to sue for goods sold and delivered without a tender, but if a tender is essential to the action of conversion, it should also be essential to this form of action of assumpsit."
When the pledgee's appropriation of the property involves its
illegal transfer to a third party, the pledgor may under proper
restrictions pursue his remedy against the transferee rather than
as against the pledgee. If the transferee takes the pledge innocently, not knowing of the pledgor's outstanding interest, and
the pledgor seeks to hold him liable he should be regarded as the
assignee of the pledgee, and be given as such appropriate rights.
fendant in return for the latter's agreement to convey real estate, which

agreement had been broken by the defendant. But there is authority
contra, Williston, Contracts, sec. 146o, and cases cited.
It has been held that a plaintiff may replevy a chattel from a defendant, who has gotten title to the same from the plaintiff through false

representations. The *action is used for the purpose of bringing about a
rescission. Porter v. Leyhe, (1896) 67 Mo. App. 540. See, Williston,

Sales sec. 567, and cases cited. Trover would' lie as well as replevin, id.
Conceding then, a right in the pledgor to rescind upon a tender of restitution, he ought to be able to bring about this result through an action
sounding in conversion. It is a legal short cut to rescission.
'If the action is for money had and received, it in effect amounts to
a ratification of the pledgee's wrongful sale of the goods. Belden v.
Perkins, (1875) 78 Ill. 449; Dimock v. United States National Bank,
(1893) 55 N. J. L. 296, 25 Ati. 926 (dictutn); Stearns v. Marsh, (1847)
4 Denio (N. Y.) 227; 47 Am. Dec. 248 (dictum); Bryson v. Raynor,
(1866) 25 Md. 424, 9o Am. Dec. 69 (dictum).
"See Woodward, Law of Quasi Contract, secs. 270-272, 277.
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The very fact that the pledgee has purported to transfer greater
rights than he had ought to and will assure to his transferee all
the rights that he did have and was legally able to pass along.
While it is true that a pledgee, as a rule, cannot separate the lien
from the debt, and if he does the lien is gone, and the intended
transferee of the lien gets nothing, this rule ought to prevail only
in cases where the taker of the property is cognizant of the real
situation, and does not intend to take whatever interest the pledgee
has. It is entirely correct to hold that the purchaser of the lien
as such without the debt gets nothing by his purchase, but on the
other hand, if A buys property from B, a pledgee, believing that
B owns the same, intending to get full ownership himself, and
not to get a lien without a debt, there would seem to be no real
objection to holding that B's purchase operated to give him all
the rights that A had, and hence as an assignment of the debt and
the security. In any event this is the theory that the courts have
adopted when the pledgor proceeds against an innocent buyer of
the pledged property, and it seems to work out as justly as possible
the rights of the parties. Hence if the debt is still unpaid, the
pledgor will not be permitted to hold the buyer for a conversion
without a tender of the debt being first made." Naturally if the
debt has already been paid, there is no further obligation resting
on the pledgor so far as tender is concerned, but the transferee
ought not to be liable for a conversion if he still has the pledge in
his possession and has exercised no acts of -ownership over the
same until the pledgor has given him notice of his rights.:"
Whenever the buyer knows of the pledge at the time of acquiring the chattel from the pledgee, and therefore does not take
4
Talty v. Trust Co., (1876) 93 U. S. 321, 23 L. Ed. 886; Donald v.
Suckling. (1866) L. R. i Q. B. 585; Williams v. Ashe, (1896) iii Cal.
i8o, 43 Pac. 599; Bradley v. Parks, (1876) 83 Ill. 169; German Savings
Bank of Baltimore City v. Renshaw, (1894) 78 Md. 475. 28 Atd. 281. In
Young v. Guy, (1882) 87 N. Y. 457, a vendor of land mortgaged the same
to A, who took to secure an antecedent debt. It was held that A was
not a bona fide purchaser, but that he did succeed to the rights of the
vendor and had a lien on. the land to the extent of the agreed purchase
price. The case involves the same principle as applied in the pledge cases,
namely that when a grantee cannot take the title, which the grantor purports to pass, still he will take whatever interest the grantor did have
in the property even though such interest is merely a debt and security.
"See supra note 47. See also Blundell-Leigh v. Attenborough, [1921]
3 K.9 B. 235.
" This is the general rule in the case of an innocent conversion. Pease
v. Smith, (1875) 61 N. Y. 477. But if the pledgee's transferee has exercised dominion over the goods, and treated them as his own through use,
no demand will be essential. Robinson v. Hartridge, (1869) 13 Fla. 5O1;
and see Hyde v. Noble, (1843) 13 N. H. 494, 38 Am. Dec. 5o8, holding
that a mere purchase constitutes a conversion.
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innocently, it is held that he becomes by the very act of taking a
converter himself, and the pledgor may sue him without a tender
of the debt, or a demand for the return of .the pledge. ' Certainly
if the debt has been paid such a decision is correct. The position of the buyer, under such conditions, is that of a deliberate
converter, but if the debt was not paid at the time of the transfer,
the soundness of the rule is not so certain. It is arguable, under
these facts, that the transfer still operated to assign the pledgee's
interest, which would involve in some jurisdictions at least the
further proposition that the pledgor could not hold the transferee
for a conversion without a tender of the debt.1 Perhaps the
suggestion is sound. It is conceivable that the act which results
in an assignment where the taking is innocent should have the
same result where the taking is in bad faith. Of course the proposition that the innocent taker is an assignee is adopted to protect
an innocent taker, and the right of the transferee is in the nature
of an "equity." Perhaps a court ought not to fabricate an "equity"
in favor of a guilty converter. But it is certain that if it is only
a matter of finding an intent, the same intent can be found in the
one case as in the other, and so possibly the guilty transferee ought
to be regarded as standing in the shoes of the pledgee.
Apparently the courts only regard the pledgee's innocent transferee as the assignee of the debt and the pledge in cases where
the pledgor is suing the transferee for the appropriation of the
pledged property. This becomes apparent in the cases where the
pledgor is suing the pledgee for the conversion resulting from the
transfer of the pledge. In most of those cases, as already noted,
the pledgee is permitted to set off or recoup the amount of the
debt secured, thereby reducing the amount of the pledgor's recovery to this extent? Permitting this recoupment must be because
the courts regard the pledgee as still being the owner of the debt.
Of course after the judgment is satisfied the pledgor no longer
has a claim on the converted chattel, and the title which the pledgee
originally purported to transfer to the purchaser or taker from
him is a reality so far as the pledgor is concerned." There is
"This proposition is usually assumed, but see cases cited supra note 47.
1

" See supra note 39.
"2See supra note 29.
'The judgment's satisfaction operates to pass the pledgor's title to
the pledgee or his successor in interest. White v. Martin, (1834) 1 Porter
(Ala.) 215; Miller v. Hyde, (1894) i6x Mass. 472, 37 N. E. 76o; Stirling
v. Garrittee, (1862) I8 Md. 468; Johnson v. Dun, (I899) 75 Minn. 533,

78 N. W. 98.
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therefore no injustice done to the pledgee's transferee. He has
gotten the fullest title that he could have expected to get from the
pledgee and his dealings with the latter are left undisturbed. For
this reason, it is not necessary in this case in order to protect the
innocent transferee to hold that he is the assignee of the debt.
If, however, the pledgor sues the transferee the courts, to protect
the innocent party, are forced to regard the transferee as entitled
to the debt, and to permit its being set off against the value of
the property. If this were not done the transferee would lose
all to no one's legitimate advantage, which, as he has intentionally
done no wrong, would be an undesirable result.
Occasionally the pledgee has illegally transferred the pledge
to another, and after so doing has sued the pledgor for the debt.
The action ought not to lie.' Relief should be denied, not because the debt has been necessarily satisfied; it may, or may not
have been, depending on the value of the property at the time of
its -illegal appropriation by the pledgee. The reason for refusing
to give relief should be, because the pledgee, having parted with
the pledge, is unable to return it the pledgor, which act by the
agreement between the parties is a condition to the pledgor's obligation to pay. It is not proper to allow a pledgee to insist upon
the pledgor's performance of his obligation, while he himself
is substantially in default with respect to the performance of a
condition to the pledgor's duty to pay. There is also a further
objection to the pledgee's recovery, namely that if the pledgee has
passed the property to another, such transferee might be regarded as the owner of the debt, and has been so regarded where he
took the property without notice of the pledge.' In spite of the
apparent soundness of the above contention, some cases have allowed a pledgee to sue for the debt after an illegal disposition of
the pledge to a third party, but have reduced the amount of recovery by the value of the property at the time of its transfer by the
pledgee, or within a reasonable time after notice of its transfer has been brought home to the pledgor."
The ratio decidendi
of these cases must be that the debt is something tistinct and
apart from the security, and so long as the debt has not been paid
it ought to be recoverable, regardless of what may have happened
'Sproul v. Sloan, (1913)

2Ai Pa. 284. 88 Atl. 5ol.
"See supra note 17, and Whitney v. Peay, (1862) 21 Ark. 22.
"Minor v. Beveridge, (1894) 141 N. Y. 399, 36 N. E. 404, 38 A. S. R.
8o4; Dimock v. United States National Bank, (1893) 55 N. J. L. 296. 25
Att. 926; Rush v. First National Bank of Kansas City, ('895) 71 Fed.
lO2. Professor Edward H. Warren approves such a decision, urging
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to the security. It must be said that so long as the pledgor is
privileged to set off the value of the pledge no harm or injustice
is done. It is true that in the end each party receives his due in
dollars and cents, but it is believed that the moral effect of such a
decision is unwholesome. It makes it possible for a person in the
position of a fiduciary to violate the confidence and trust placed in
him, and then to proceed as if no wrong had been done by him.
The rule just mentioned, permitting the pledgee, in spite of his
conversion, to sue upon the debt has led to the following situation: a pledgee being a converter, may sue his pledgor for the debt
and a pledgor being a defaulting debtor may also sue his pledgee for
conversion.' In the first action the pledgor in most jurisdictions
may set off or recoup the value of the property ' and in the second, the pledgee may reduce the amount of recovery by the amount
of the debt.' Although no authority has been found it is certain
that an action brought by either party and pursued to judgment.
must prevent a suit by the other, if the proper matter of recoupIn the pledgee's action the
ment is duly pleaded and allowed.'
recoupment is a substitute for the pledgor's action of trover, and
in the pledgor's action it is a substitute for the pledgee's action of
debt. The result, therefore, is that whichever action is brought the
rights of both parties may be finally settled and adjudicated. Moreover, if the pledgee's disposition of the property has been a transfer of the same to another, title in such transferee may be confirmed because the pledgor in either action is allowed the value of
the pledge.
that there is "no occasion for the court to lay down a rule that an unauthorized transfer of the pledge forfeits the right in personam to which
the pledge was security." Warren. Cases on Property 374. It is submitted that the matter is not one of forfeiture, but is purely a matter of
contract law. The pledge cannot be treated as a transaction separate and
apart from the loan; it is a part of the same contract. The agreement
is that when the money is paid the security will be returned. If the
pledgee cannot perform this agreement, his right in personam is not enforceable. See Upham v. Barbour, (i896) 65 Minn. 364, 68 N_ W. 42,
where the court apparently was willing to entertain an action on the debt
subject to the pledgor's counterclaim for a conversion of the pledge.
But such a decision is proper as the defendant did not object to the action
on the debt.
"'See supra notes 34 and 56.
"See supra note 56.
"See supra note 29.
'Of course in the normal action of trover the title will not be confirened
in the defendant until the judgment is satisfied. But if the pledgee is
suing the pledgor on the debt, and the debt exceeds the value of the
property, and recoupment is allowed, title will be immediately confirmed,
because the pledgor is allowed by the recoupment the value of the property, it being deducted from the pledgee's claim.

